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APPEARANCE-VOID SuMMoNs-EFFEc .- AMEs v. FREmMAN, I2 PAc.,
i6o (KAN.).-Held, where a defendant is served with a void summons
issued by a justice of the peace, but at the time named in the summons
appears before the justice of the peace and submits himself to be sworn
as a witness by the plaintiff and testifies as to the merits of the case in
response to questions propounded by the attorney for the plaintiff in the
presence of the justice, such conduct amounts to a voluntary appearance
to the action, and is as binding as the valid service of a legal summons
would have been; and a judgment entered upon such trial will not be
enjoined as void.
An appearance is the proceeding by which the defendant submits
himself to the jurisdiction of'the court; Crawford v. Vinton, xo2 Mich.,
83; Flint v. Comly, 95 Me., 25r; as by demurring; Gilbert v. Hall, iiS
Ind., 549; or by making a motion which involves the merits; Elliott v.
Lawhead, 43 Ohio St., 171; or by taking any action, except to object to the
service of the writ,, which recognizes the case as in court; Lampley v.
Beavers, 25 Ala., 534. But a mere attendance at court without a full
understanding of the pending action and the proceedings does not consti-
tute an appearance; Merkle v. Rochester, 13 Hun. (N. Y.), 157. Neither
is the execution of an attachment bond by a defendant in attachment an
appearance; Hilton & Allcn v. Consumers' Can Co., io3 Va., 255; nor the
giving of bail, after arrest under bail process; -Lanneau v. Ervin, 12
Rich. Law (S. C.), 3. As to an appearance curing a defective summons,
the weight of authority seems to be in accord with the principal case,
holding that an appearance by the defendant waives all defects in the
process or its service. Childs v. Limback, 30 Ia., 398; Pool v. Mf inge,
5o Ala., ioo; Bairer v. Lasch, 28 Wis., 268; Baldwin v. Murphy, 82 Ill.,
485. But some courts modify this rule, holding that a void process is
not cured by appearance; Beall v. Blake, 13 Ga., 217; Osgood v. Thurston,
40 Mass., i10. In New York, however, it has been held that where a
defendant appears, even though he is ignorant that the process is void,.
there has been a waiver. Pixley v. Winchell, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 366.
BROKERS-WHEN COMMISSIONS EARNED-DEFAULT OF PURCHASER.-
NVEEKS V. HAZARD, 127 N. W., iog.-Held, that a broker, employed on
agreement to procure a purchaser for property on terms satisfactory to the
owner, is entitled to his commission when the purchaser procured by
him contracts with the owner on terms fixed by the owner, even if the
purchaser fails to' fully perform the contract. Evans and Weaver, JJ.,
dissen ting.
A broker employed to procure a purchaser for property is entitled to
his commission if through his instrumentality a valid enforceable contract
of sale is entered into between the owner and the purchaser procured by
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the broker. Lunney v. Healey, 56 Nebr., 313; Pinkerton v. Hudson, 87
Ark., 5o6; Friedstedt v. Dietrich, 84 111. App., 61o. This 
is true, in the
absence of an express contract of warranty, even if the purchaser 
is finan-
cially unable or for any other reasons fails to fully perform 
the contract.
Moore v. Irwin, 89 Ark., 289; Greene v. Hollingshead, 40 Ill. 
App., 95.
Or if the contract is mutually abandoned. Sullivan v. Frazier; 
57 N. Y.
Supp., ,oo8. There are, however, well-considered cases in Maryland 
and
Rhode Island which require the contract of sale to be merged 
into an
actual sale in order to entitle the broker to his commission, 
unless it
clearly appears that the owner did not rely on the broker's judgment 
as to
the financial responsibility of the purchaser. Riggs v. Turnbull, 
io5 Md.,
135; Butler v. Baker, 17 R. I., 582. But no question 
can arise as to the
doctrine that a broker, upon express agreement with the 
principal, is en-
titled to his commission when a contract is made on the 
principal's own
terms, even if the contract is never fully carried out. 
Hipple v. Laird,
189 Pa. St., 472; Alt v. Doscher, 92 N. Y. Supp., 439, affirmed 
on opinion
of lower court in x86 N. Y., 566; Hallack v. Hinckley, 19 
Colo., 38. But in
no case will a broker be entitled to his commission if 
there has been
fraud, bad faith, or fault on his part. Moore v..Irwin, 
supra; Alt v.
Doscher, supra; Burnhasn v. Upton, 174 Mass., 4o8.
. CONTRACTs-FRAuD--NEGLIGENCE As DEFENsE.-COLORADO INV. LOAN
Co. v. BEUCHAT, Iii PAC., 61 (CoLo.).-Held, that 
where one of two con-
tracting parties is fraudulently induced to execute a written 
instrument on
the false representation that it expresses the agreement 
which the parties
had previously made orally, the party defrauded may defend 
against the
enforcement of the fraudulent instrument, though he 
is chargeable with
negligence in relying on the false representations, and 
in not reading the
instrument.
As a general rule, where a contract is procured by false representa-
tion of a material fact, the fraud is a defense against the enforcement 
of
the instrument. Davis v. Read, 37 Fed., 418; McShane 
v. Hazelhurst,
5o Md., io7. And non-disclosure of a material fact may 
be sufficient to
constitute such fraud. Stewart v. Wyomti Cattle Ranch Co., 128 U. 
S.,
383. However, there is a conflict of opinion as to whether 
this defense
may be made, when the party defrauded is chargeable with 
negligence in
relying upon the false representations. The majority opinion 
seems to
allow a defense under such circumstances as in the principal 
case. Liv'-
ingston v. Strong, io7 Ill., 295. Contra, May v. Johnson, 
3 Ind., 449.
Thus, it has been held that a failure to examine a deed, 
Albany Savings
Institution v. Burdick, 87 N. Y., 40; or a failure to make 
inquiries as to
the truth of facts stated; is not such negligence as will 
bar recovery.
Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y., 275. In the same manner mere 
praise or an
expression of opinion as to value is not sufficient to warrant 
the setting
aside of a contract. Zernple v. Hughes, 235 Ill., 424; Flynn v. Finch, 137
Iowa, 378. And invariably, in order to avoid the 
legal effect of a written
instrument knowingly executed and intended to embody the agreement, 
the
proof of fraud must be strong and clear. McCall v. Bxshnell, 41 Minn.,
37; Parlin v. Smndll, 68 Me., az9.
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CONTRACTs-TRADE UNIONS-CoNTRACrs WITH EMPLOYER.-KISSAM
v. UNrIT STATES PRINTING Co. OF OHIO, 92 N. E., 214 (N. Y.).-Held, a
contract between an employer and trades unions, prohibiting the employ-
ment of non-union workmen, is not invalid as to such workmen, where it
results in great benefit to the employer, disposes of differences between
him and the labor unions, is not entered into with malice against the non-
union workmen, nor with intent to injure them, and where it is not
sought to compel them to join the union.
Agreements which are contrary to public policy are void. McNamara
v. Gargett, 68 Mich., 454; Cothran v. Ellis, 125 IMI., 496. But a contract
to trade exclusively with a particular party is not void. Long v. Towl,
42 Mo., $45; Ward v. Hogan, ii Abb. N. Cases (N. Y.), 478. And it is
not illegal for workmen to form an association to protect themselves
against the encroachments of their employers. Snow v. Wheeler, 113
Mass., x7g; Gray v, Building Trades Council, 9I Minn., 171. However, an
agreement between a labor association and an employers' association.
that all employees of the members of the employers' association shall
be members of the labor association, is illegal. Curran v. Galen. 152
N. Y, 33. The question involved in the principal case seems to have been
considered but once before, both decisions being in accord. Jacobs v.
Cohen, 183 N. Y., 2o7. But in contracts for public work, stipulations that
none but union labor shall be employed, are invalid. Atlanta v. Stein,
iii Ga., 789; Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill., '94; State ex rel. Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Toole, 26 Mont., 22.
COURTS-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT.-BEATY V. GOGGAN & BRO., 131
S. W., 631 (TEx.).-Held, that a court has jurisdiction of an action for
recovery of a debt and foreclosure of the lien thereof on personal prop-
erty, the value of the property not exceeding its jurisdiction, though 'the
amount of the debt does.
The amount demanded in the complaint is, in general, the criterion of
jurisdiction. Pharis v. Carver, 52 Ky., 236; Burr v. Bayne, io Watts
(Pa.), 299. But a modification of this rule is made in a suit in chancery,
where, to protect land from a claim assessed against it, the value of the
land, and not the amount of the claim, determines the jurisdiction of the
court. Matteson v. Matteson, i32 Mich., S16; Speyer v. Miller, io8 La.,
2o4. Again, where a court renders a judgment within its jurisdiction, the
fact that the complaint prayed a recovery in excess of the jurisdiction will
not affect the validity of the judgment. Wratten v. Wilson, 22 Cal., 466;
In re Barbour, 52 How. Prac. (N. Y.), 94. And jurisdiction is not lost
where a portion of the claim is disallowed, thus bringing the amount below
the jurisdiction of the court. Hardin v. Cass County, 42 Fed., 652. As
to whether the market or face value of a security is the test of jurisdiction.
there is a conflict. Some courts hold that they cannot judicially know
that the market value is different from the value on the face of the instru-
ment. Gentry v. Gilkey, 24 Ky., 372. On the other hand, some courts
hold that the market and not the face value of the subject of the con-
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troversy determines the jurisdiction. Wisby v. Houston Nat. Bank, 28
Tex. Civ. App., 268. It is well settled, however, that a creditor may
voluntarily remit a part of his claim so as to bring it within the juris.
diction of a particular court. Mattock v. Lare, 32 Mo., 262; Carpenter
,. Wells, 65 Ill., 451; Bowditch v. Salisbury, 9 Johns. (N. Y.), 366.
CRIMINAL LAw-EiDENCE AS TO ILLEGAL -SALE OF LiQuoR-AccoM-
PLIcE.-RAY v. STATE, 131 So., 542.-Held, that the purchaser in an illegal
sale of intoxicating liquor is not an accomplice in the violation of the law.
so as to make his testimony subject to the rule governing testimony of
accomplices.
The purchaser of liquor sold in violation of law is not to be regarded
as an accomplice. Wakeman v. Chambers, 69 Iowa, i69; State v. Rand,
51 N. H., 361; Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick., 476. 
Oue decision in
Tennessee holds to the contrary view. State v. Bonner, 2 Head, 135. 
A
later decision in that state, however, modifies the doctrine 
therein stated.
Harney v. State, 8 Lea, 113. The testimony of the purchaser is 
not,
therefore, generally to be regarded as that of an accomplice within 
the
rule requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice. People
v,. Smith, 28 Hun., 626; Borck v. State, 39 So., 58o. No exception 
occurs
because the purchaser may have had knowledge that the sale was illegal;
State v. Teahan, So Conn., 92; or that the purchaser was employed as 
an
informer or spy to secure conviction on illegal sales, and was 
the cause of
the sale being made. State v. Baden, 37 Minn., 212; State 
v. McKean,
36 Iowa, 343. But it has been held that the testimony 
of the purchaser





- B OLIN v. BOLIN, 92
N. E., 530 (IL.).-Held, that money paid by a father on the purchase 
of
property conveyed to a son could not be considered as an 
advancement,
where it was not charged in writing.
An advancement is an irrevocable gift in praesenti of money 
or prop-
erty, real or personal, to a child by a parent, to enable the donee 
to antici-
pate his inheritance to the extent of the gift. Miller's 
Appeal, 31 Pa. St.,
337; Waldron v. Taylor, 52 W. Va., 284. In mpst 
jurisdictions it is pro-
vided by statute that an advancement cannot be made unless 
the gift or
grant be expressed in writing as an advancement, 
or -charged in writing
by the intestate, or acknowledged in writng by the donee. Bartmcss 
v.
Fuller, 170 Ill., 193; Lodge '. Fitch, 172 Nebr., 652. A loan 
cannot be
changed into an advancement, withouit the consent of the party 
to be so
charged. Melony's Appeal, 78 Conn., 334. No particula" form 
of words
is necessary to constitute an advancement, but the words must 
show that
it is intended as an advancement. Bulkeley v. Noble, 2 Pick 
(Mass.),
337. It has been held where a father gave his son $5,ooo to enable 
him to
purchase an interest in a patent right, and to secure the same 
took back a
chattel mortgage upon the patent, that this was a loan and 
not an ad-
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vancement. Bruce v. Griscom, 9 Hun. (N. Y.), 28o. The presumption
that property put by the father in the name of his son was by way of an
advancement is not conclusive, and may be rebutted by proof that the
father advanced the greater part of the purchase price and the son the
remainder thereof, and it was agreed between them that the son should
hold the title for their mutual benefit. Taylor v. Taylor, 136 Cal., 92.
EMINENT DOMAIN-STREETS-CONDEMNATION OF LAND REQUIRED FOR
RAILROAD PURPOSES.-PORTLAND Ry., LIGHT & POWER CO. V. CITY OF
PORTLAND, 181 FED., 632.-Held, that where a city had only general
charter power to open, lay out, establish, widen, alter, extend, vacate, or
close streets, and to appropriate and condemn private property therefor,
it had no power to condemn a part of a railroad's right of way to con-
struct a street longitudinally along the same, especially where there was
no provision for joint use of the property by the railroad company and
the public.
The right of eminent domain is not inherent in a municipality but
may be conferred upon it by appropriate legislation. Warner v. Gun-
iison, 2 Colo. App., 430; Butler -. Thomasville, 74 Ga., 57o. Where
express statutory authority exists, however, authorizing this action, this
will control, but the right must be strictly exercised. Abbott on Muni-
cipal Corporations, Sec. 1819. It is generally held that the right to ap-
propriate a portion of a railroad company's right of way longitudinally is
not conferred by general authority to condemn; that the power must be
conferred expressly or by necessary implication. Ill. Cent. R. R: Co. -,.
Chicago, Burlington & Northern R. R. Co., 122 Ill., 473. The law seems
to be well settled that lands once taken for public use cannot, under
general laws, without an express act of the legislature for that purpose,
be appropriated by proceedings in inviturn to a different public use. The
legislature, as the supreme and sovereign power in the state, may doubt-
less interfere with property held by a corporation for one purpose, and
apply it to another; but the legislature's intention so to do must be stated
in clear and express terms, or must appear from necessary implication.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. -v. North, io3 Ind., 486. As where it
appears by the statute or by the application of the statute to the subject
matter that the contemplated road cannot reasonably be built without
appropriating land already devoted to public use, in which case an impli-
cation arises that the legislature intended that such appropriation might
be made. Providence etc. R. R. v. Norwich etc. R. R., 138 Mass., 277;
Housatonic R. R. z. Lee & Hudson R. R., x8 Mass., 391.
EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE.-GERMER v. GAMBILL, 131 S. W., 268
(KY ).-Held, that where the true intention of the parties is not ex-
pressed in written contract, they may show that the real contract was
not reduced to writing through mistake as to the effect of the words or
otherwise.
Parol evidence, though not admissible to add to or vary the terms of
a written contract, is admissible to prove facts and circumstances for the
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purpose of showing the understanding of the parties of its terms.
Drinkhouse v. Surette, 83 Mass., 443. So where there is a mistake in a
contract and the true intentions of the parties are not expressed. How-
land v. Blake, 97 U. S., 624. And it is admissible to explain the meaning
as well as their mutual acts, where there is an ambiguity. Bates v.
Dehaven, xo Ind., 3i9. As well as to show the remainder of a contract,
which the writings executed by the parties on their face, show not to have
been fully expressed therein. Miller v. Goodrich, 53 Mo. App., 43o.
But these contentions must be proved to the exclusion of every reasonable
doubt. Howland v. Blake, supra; Goldborough v. Ringbold, I Md. Ch.
D., 239.
IOMICIDE-PRVENTING ESCAPE OF PRISONER-ARREST FOR MISDEMEAN-
OR.-LEwis V. COMMONWEALTH, 131 SOUTHW.VESTERN REPORTFR, 517.-Held,
that a police officer has no right to shoot one arrested for a misdemeanor
to prevent his escape.
In general a police officer has no right to do great bodily harm to or
take the life of a person arrested for a misdemeanor to prevent his escape.
Head v. Martin, 85 Ky, 480. Such is the case even if the officer has
knowledge of the desperate character of the prisoner, although such cir-
cumstances may form a question of fact for the jury. Commonwealth v.
Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. Ct., 512. Because the officer is never required to
retreat, and may meet force with force, in order to subdue the efforts
of the prisoner to escape. Smith v. State, 59 Ark., 132; State v. Garrett,
6o N. C., x44. The officer may use a deadly weapon and .even take the
life of the prisoner, if such action is necessary in self-defense to save
his own life. Smith v. State, 59 Ark., 132. But in any case the officer
must be careful not to exceed the reasonable necessity of the case. Dil-
ger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky., 55o, 56o; .Commonwealth v. Max, 8 Phila.,
422. Some few cases hold that an officer can use violence and even take
the life of a prisoner arrested for a misdemeanor, if necessary not only
for his own protection but to effect his purpose of preventing an escape.
State v. Dierberger, 96 Mo., 666. And it has been held that flagrant mis-
demeanors, as in case of riots or dangerous wounds, may justify the
killing of the prisoner to prevent his escape, for the presumption is very
great that the offense will turn out to be a felony. Slate v. McNally, 87
Mo., 644.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE-CONTRACTS ENFORCE-
ABLE-ASSENT or HUSnAND.--BUSHNELL v. BERTOLETT, 69-S. E. 6Io (N. C.).
Held, that where a married woman signed a contract for a lot of apple
trees, and after accepting and paying for a part, refuses to accept and pay
for the remainder, the contract is not enforceable against her separate
estate. Clark, C. J., dissenting.
At common law the contracts of a married woman were absolutely
void. Prentiss v. Paisley, 25 Fla., 927; Condon v. Barr., 49 N. J. L., 53.
And, independant of statute, her contracts do not personally bind her, even
in equity. Butler'v. Buckingham, 5 Day (Conn.), 492; Davis v. Smith,
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75 MO., 29. A married woman has no power to contract unless in direct
refereqce to her separate property. Stillwell v. Adams, 29 Ark., 346.
Whether the contract of a married woman is in relation to her separate
estate is a question of fact. Stenger Benev. Ass'n v. Stenger, 54 Neb.,
427. To bind the separate property of the wife there must be an express
agreement to bind it. It is not enough that she asked credit, and that she
had a separate estate, and on this account credit was extended to her.
Dismukes v. Shaffer, 54 S. W., 67r (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899). Nevertheless,
it was held in this case that the separate estate of a married woman is
liable for all debts charged thereon either expressly or by fair impli-
cation, and is bound by all her contracts on her own behalf which are
made upon the credit of such estate, and whether that be so or not must
be judged by the circumstances of each particular estate. Crockett v.
Doriot, 85 Va., 24o. It has been expressly decided, limiting this right,
that the contract of a married woman can be made good only out of
the separate estate which is hers at the time of the contract. Filler v.
Tyler, 9r Va., 458. In some states a married woman can charge her real
estate by such contracts only as are reasonably calculated to make the
estate profitable to her, or to preserve it, or to protect her title thereto.
Smith v. Howe, 31 Ind., 233. The statutes in some states require the
husband's consent to the wife's contract before she shall be liable thereon.
Wood v. Potts, x4O Ala, 425; Brinkley v. Ballance, 126 N. C., 393. While
in others, a wife's property is her separate estate, in respect to which she
may make binding contracts without the assent of the husband. Grapen-
aether v. Fejervary, 9 Ia., 163.
JUDGES--QUALIFICATIoN-RELATION TO PARTIE.-Ex PARTE WEsT, 13-
S. W., 339 (TEx.).-Held, a district judge who was a second cousin of
plaintiff's wife was disqualified to try the case, so that orders made therein
were corain non judice.
Under the common law a judge was not disqualified by relationship
to a party to a cause. Brooke and the Earl of Rivers, Hardres Rep., 503.
But it is now generally provided by statute that relationship between the
judge and a party litigant disqualifies the judge. State Vi. Wail, 41 Fla.,
463; Horton v. Howard, 79 Mich., 642; State v. Foster, 112 La., 533;
Chase v. Weston, 75 Ia., 159. And such a provision applies equally to
civil and criminal trials. People v. Connor, r42 N. Y., 13o. Although
mere formal and ministerial acts are not void by reason of the disquali-
fication of the judge. McFarlane v. Clark, 39 Mich., 44; State v. Gurney,
17 Nebr., 523. The relationship, however, to afford ground for disqualifi-
cation, must exist at the time of the trial. Patterson v. Collier, 57 Ga., 419;
Winchester v. Hinsdale, 12 Conn., 88. Futhermore, a judge can legally
recuse himself only where a party to the case has a right to recuse him.
State v. Judges' Tenth Judicial District, 41 La. Ann., 319. And it has been
held that the disqualification of a judge may be waived by consent of the
parties. Buena Vista Bank v. Grier, 114 Ga., 398. Most courts hold that
the fact that a stockholder in a corporation, which is a party litigant, is
a relative of a judge, does not disqualify the judge from sitting. Matter
of Dodge and Stevenson Man'f Co., 77 N. Y., ioz; Robinson v. Southern
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Pacific Co., io5 Cal.. 426. Contra: First National Bank v. McGuire, 12
S. D., 226.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-WORDS ACTIONABLE-IMtPUTING DISLUALIFICATION
OF AN ATTORNEY.-IONTGOMERY v. NEAw ERA PRINTING Co., 78 ALT., 85.-
Held, that any oral or written words which impute to an attorney-at-law
the want of the requisite qualifications to practice, or with having been
guilty of corrupt, dishonest, or improper practice in the performance of
his duties as a lawyer, are actionable per se.
Any oral or written words, imputing to an attorney-at-law the want
of requisite qualifications to practice law, or with having been guilty of
corrupt, dishonest, or improper practice as lawyer are actionable per se.
Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal., 394; State v. Cooper, 138 Iowa,, 516. As in
imputations affecting professional capacities generally it is essential that
the charge should actually touch the attorney in his profession. Stewart
v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 40 Minn., ioi; Kirby v. Martindale, ig S. D.,
394. To thus affect his profession it has been held that the charge need
only be direct rather than express, although a general imputation, equally
injurious to any one against whom it might be made, may not be action-
able per se, unless direct application be made. Sanderson v. Cadewell, 45
N. Y. 398. Words charging an attorney with want of integrity, whether
used generally of his profession or particularly as to some one transac-
tion are actionable per se. Garr i,. Selden, 6 Barb., 416. But a charge
of ignorance or want of skill in a particular transaction is not usually
actionable per se. Garr s,. Selden, supra; Foot v. Brown, 8 Johns., So.
Among the more important imputations against a lawyer actionable per se
are those charging him with dishonesty or breach of trust in regard to
property of clients under his control, Mains v. Whiting, 87 Mich., 172;
unfaithfulness generally to clients, Hetherington v. Sterry, 28 Kan., 426;
Chipman v. Cook. 2 Tyler (Vt.) 456; cheating or swindling. Rush v. Ca-
venaugh, 2 Pa. St., 187; ignorance of the law, Goodenow v. Tappan,
i Ohio, 6o; falsely personating a constable; McDermott u. Evening Journal
Assoc. 43 N. J. L., 488; giving erroneous and dishonest advice, Ludwig v'.
Cramer, 53 Wis., 193; offering to divulge client's secrets, Riggs v. Deuni-
ston, 3 Johns. Cas., 198; making extortionate charges for services, Atkin-
son -,. Detroit Free Press Co.. 46 Mich.. 341; charging two fees for same
service, Mosnat v'. Snyder. io5 Iowa, 500; being a "shyster," Gribble v.
Pioneer Press Co., 34 Minn., 342.
1MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-I NI)EPFNDENT CONTRACTORs-LiABILITY.
FROELICH V. CITY OF Naw YORx. 93 N. E., 79 (N. Y.).-Held, that an
independent contractor for the whole of an improvement for a city and
a sub-contractor dbing a part of the work are not servants or agents of
the city reserving the right to supervise and inspect the work, and the city
is not liable for the negligence where the plan for the work is reasonably
safe, and there is no interference therewith by the city which results in
injury.
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Where a municipal corporation has the power to let a contract for
the construction of a sewer, and it enters into such a contract with com-
petent contractors, doing an independent business, they are not the serv-
ants or agents of the city, and the city is not liable for their negligence
even when it reserves the right to change, inspect, and supervise to the
extent necessary to procure the result intended by the contract, provided
the plan is reasonably safe, the work is lawful, is not a nuisance when
completed, and there is no interference therewith by municipal officers
which results in injury. Uppington v. City of New York, z65 N. Y., 222,
The case of Engler v. City of Seattle, 40 Wash., 72, holds that a contractor
with a city for the construction of a street improvement is an independent
contractor, though the city engineer has the right to superintend the work;
and an employee of the contractor is not a servant of the city. and it is
not liable for an injury received by him while at work in a dangerous
place. The power of superintendence does not affect the relation of an
independent contractor. But Schumacher v. City of New York, 57 N. Y.
Supp., 968, holds that a city is liable for injuries caused by the negligent
performance of work by one acting under a contract with it, where it
reserves to itself the right to direct the manner of performance. And in
City of Chicago -v. Murdoch, 72 N. E., 46, it is held that where a city's
contract for the construction of a tunnel provided that all labor performed
should be subject to the inspection of the commissioner of public works,
the city was liable for negligence of an independent contractor in doing
the work. And Dunstan -v. City of New York, 86 N. Y. Supp., 562, says,
a city is liable for damages caused by the escape of water from pipes
negligently permitted to remain in a leaky condition after reasonable
notice to the city of the condition, although it was caused primarily by the
negligence of an independent contractor, for whose acts the city was not
responsible. However Ege v. Phoenix Brick and Construction Co., 94 S.
W., 999, holds tl~at the fact that a contract for a street improvement gave
the city engineer authority to direct at what point the work should com-
mence, to see that it was done properly, and provided that if anyone em-
ployed on the work should refuse to obey the engineer he should be dis-
charged, did not render the contractor the servant or agent of the city,
hence the city was not liable for negligence of the contractor. And
Ginther v. Forkville Borough, 3 Pa. Super. Ct., 5o3, holds, that a munici-
pality is not liable for the negligent performance of a contract by an
independent contractor resulting in injury to the property of a citizen
even if the work is done under the direction of an official authorized to
inspect it who is vested with all powers necessary to secure compliance
with the contract, payment even being conditional on his approval of the
work. See Cary s,. City of Chicago, 6o Ill. App., 34r, and Hookey v.
Oakdale Borough, 5 Pa. Super. Ct., 404.
UNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STREETs-OIsTRUCTIONs-LI MITATIONS.
SMITH v. ADAMS, 92 N. E., 76o (M.,ss.). Held, that steps maintained
within the limits of a street for over forty years may not be removed by
the public authorities.
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The municipality has no power to authorize a stairway or other pro-
jection into the street, to the detriment of the travelling public. Pettis v.
Johnson, 56 Ind., 139. Temporary or small encroachments are held to be
properly permitted under certain restrictions, where authorized by and not
in conflict with statutory or charter provisions. Wyan, v. Village of St.
Johns, ioo Mich., 57i. Where a fence was erected within a street and was
so maintained for thirty years, the city is estopped to deny that such fence
is not the true boundary line. City of Joliet .v. Werner, 166 Ill., 34. Yet
where an obstruction was originally built under a claim of right, and had
existed for ten years, the city is not estopped in an action to remove it.
City of Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa, 437. And neither a city's
acquiescence in an obstruction, or laches in resorting to legal remedies, to
remove it, not the doctrine of equitable estoppel, nor prescription, can
defeat the right of the city to maintain a suit in equity to remove the
obstruction. Webb v. City of Denopolis, 95 Ala., 116.
NUISANcE-NATURE OF INJURY IFRo.-RoIINSON v. DALE, 131 S. W.,
3o8 (TEx.).-Held, that because the value of a person's property may be
decreased, or because the risk to the property from fire is increased, by
the structures necessary for the operation of a business, this does not
render the business a nuisance.
The law is settled, on sound reasons, that the mere fact of the diminu-
tion of the value of complainant's property, or the increased risks from
the hazards of fire, occasioned by a structure erected by a defendant near
the complaindnt's premises, without mere, is unavailing as a ground of
equitable relief. 2 Story's Eq. Jur., 925; Rhodcs v. Dunbar, 57 Pa., 274;
Gallagher v. Flury, 99 Md., i8T. For this is one of many risks and
discomforts naturally incident to city life, which persons of prudence
can not fail to reasonably anticipate. Ray v. Lyons, io Ala., 63. And it
is. a general rule that when the thing complained of is not a nuisance
per se, but may become so, according to circumstances, and the injury
apprehended is eventful or contingent, equity will not interfere; the pre-
sumption.being that a person entering upon a legitimate business will
conduct it in a proper way so that it will not constitute a nuisance.
Chambers v. Cramer, 49 W. Va., 395. Anticipation of injuries is not
sufficient grounds to justify an injunction, unless it appears that the party
threatens or intends to conduct the business so as to constitute a nuisance
per se. Bozen v. Mauzy, 117 Ind., 258. But this intention must be proved
beyond a doubt. Bell ,. Riggs, 38 La. Ann., 555. For it is a just sequence
of the maxim, Sic utcre tio ut alienuin non laedas. Campbell v. Seaman,
63 N. Y., s68.
PARTNERSIIi--AccoLUNTING-RIGHT To.-WEsTWOOD V. CRISSEY, 124
N. Y. SuPP., 97.-Held, that plaintiff having formulated an enterprise to
be conducted under a partnership agreement, whereby one of his as-
sociates with the other's knowledge undertook to indorse plaintiff's notes
to enable him to furnish his share of the advances necessary to be made
by the firm, is entitled to a fair proportion of the profits, though his as-
sociates purported to expel him from the firm for non payment of his
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share of such advances; the promise to indorse his notes being broken.
McLennan, P. J., and Robson, J., dissenting.
The law does not favor forfeitures and it does not treat the mere
failure of one partner to pay his share of the capital, expenses or debts,-
as a cause for forfeiting his interest in the firm property. Kimball v.
Gearhart, 12 Cal., 27. Such a failure will not justify his co-partners in
exercising the powers of a court of equity and ejecting him from the part-
nership. Campbell v. Sherman, 55 Hun., 6o9; Patterson v. Silliman, 28
Pa., 304. It is the duty of the partners to conform in all respects to the
partnership agreement. Murrell v,. Murrell, 3 La. Ann., 1233. And no
majority of the partners can expel any partner in the absence of an ex-
press agreement between the partners; however, where there is such power
it can only be exercised in good faith and not for private benefit of any
of the parties. Blisset v. Daniel, io Hare, 493. A partner will not be
deprived of his just profits when he was unable to fulfill part of his agree-
ment for reasons beyond his control. Stuart v. Harmon, 24 Ky. L. R.,
1829. For the obligation of good faith rests upon the partners not only
during partnership, but extends to statements and dealings made while
negotiating for its formation. Williamtson v. Monroe, ioi Fed., 3 .
TzmE-CoNsTRucTioN OF STATUTE-SUNDAYS.--GuLF, C. & S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Lours WERNER STAVE Co., 131 S. W., 658 (TFx.).-Held, that where
a statute requires an act to be performed within a certain number of days
or hours, and does not expressly exclude Sunday in computing such time,
the court cannot construe it so as to exclude Sunday, so that a statute,
imposing a penalty on shippers for failure to load within 48 hours after
the delivery of cars, should under such rule be construed to include Sun-
day within the time provided.
At common law Sunday was dies non juridicus. Allen v. Godfrey, 44
N. Y., 433; Blood v. Bates, 31 Vt., 147. And in general, in computing time
for the performance of a contract, etc., the last day for performance
falling on Sunday, an extension until Monday is allowed. Avery v. Ste-
,wart, 2 Conn., 69; Salter s. Burt, 20 Wend. (N. Y.), 2o5. Contra:
Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C., 24I. But where the length of time
for performing an act is expressly provided by statute, the weight of au-
thority is in accord with the principal case, holding that no extension is
allowed. Bissell v. Bissell, ii Barb. (N. Y.), 96; Alderman v. Phelps,
z5 Mass., 225; Patrick v. Faulke, 45 Mo., 312. Some states, however, hold
the contrary. Edmunson u. Wragg, io4 Pa., 500. And this contrary
doctrine has been modified somewhat, it being held that if an act may be
lawfully done on Sunday, the last day falling on Sunday, it is not excluded.
Swift v. Wood, io3 Va., 494. But if is well settled that in any case inter-
mediate Sundays are included in the computation of such time. Martin
s. Sunset Telp. & TeIg. Co., i8 Wash., 26o.
USURY-PARoL EVIDENCE-WRITTEN CONTRACT-VALIDITY.-IN RE
STRASCHNOW, I81 FED., 337.-Held, that where a contract evidencing a
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loan of money and the employment of the lender was attacked 
for usury,
parol testimony of the conversations of the 
parties prior to the execution
of the contract was not objectionable on the 
ground that all prior nego-
tiations must be deemed merged in the written 
contract.
In the Federal courts and in many of the state 
courts it is held, in
usurious contracts, that the intention of the* 
parties is the controlling
factor. Miller v. Tiffany, i Wall., 298; Dickenson 
v. Edwards, 77 N. Y.,
573; Pancoast v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 
97 Ind.,. 172. It is quite immaterial
in what manner or form, or under what pretence 
it is cloaked, if the in-
tention was to receive a greater rate of interest 
than the law allows for
the use of money, it-will vitiate the contract 
with the taint of usury.
Whether the transaction was so intended, where, 
upon its face, it does
not appear to be usurious, is a question of intention 
for the decision of the
jury. Mitchell v. Napier, 22 Tex., x2o. Payroll 
evidence is admissible to
explain, but not to vary or contradict writings. 
Cooper v. Berry, 21 Ga.,
526. Any evidence surrounding and so connected 
with a transaction as
to throw light upon it and disclose, or tend reasonably 
to show, its true
character, is admissible upon the issue of usury, 
although the contract
is in writing and appears upon its face fair and 
legal. Peightal v. Build-
ing Co., 25 Tex. Civ. App., 39o. While a valid 
written contract can not
be varied or contradicted by parol, it is competent 
by such evidence to
show that the writing is but a cover for usury, 
penalty, or forfeiture.
Lytle v. 'Scottish American Mortgage Co., 122 
Ga., 458; Campbell v.
Corinable, 98 N. Y. Supp., 231. Parol testimony 
is admitted to enable
one to show that a written instrument is not 
valid, but void. Lytic v.
Scottish American Mortgage Co., i22 Ga., 458.
WlTNESSES-PRIVILEGED COM MUNICATIONS-HUsBAND 
AND WIFE.-
PEOPLE V. DUNNIGAN, 128 -N. W., i8o (Micu.).-Held, 
that a self-incrim-
inating letter written by accused to his wife, 
but not received by her.
being interdepted by the sheriff, is not privileged 
within the statute which
prohibits examination of spouses respecting communications 
between
them.
It is a well established rule, both at common law and 
by statute, that
confidential communications between the husband 
and wife are privileged,
in both civil and criminal proceedings, except where 
they themselves are
parties to the action. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 
163 U. S., 342; People V.
Warner, 117 Cal.. 637. And, as a general rule, letters 
passing between
husband and wife are protected. State v. Ulrich, 
IHO Mo., 35o. However,
it has been held generally, as in the principal case, 
that where a self-in-
criminating letter falls into the hands of third parties 
it may be offered
in evidence, not being privileged. State v. Hoyt, 47 
Conn., 518; State of
Kansas v. Buffington, 2o Kans., 599. Contra: Wilkerson 
v. State, 9i Ga.,
729. And the mere fact that it was procured by the 
falsehood of a public
officer will not exclude it. Cons. v. Goodwin, i86 Pa. 
St., 218. Futher-
more, a confidential, oral communication between a husband 
and wife may
be testified to by a concealed witness. Gannon v. State 
of Ill., 127 Ill..
507; Cons. v. Griffin, io -Mass., i81. However, 
if the confession, written
or oral, was obtained in an attempt to produce a false 
statement, it is not
admissible in -evidence. People v. ifcCullough, 8i Mich., 
25.
